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Abstract/Introduction
With the explosion of wireless networks appearing in buildings, business
and educational campuses, and even homes; security is a large concern in order
to prevent attempted intrusions and malicious attacks from the retrieval of
confidential data. Wireless Fidelity, Wi-Fi for short, does provide security in the
form called Wired Equivalent Privacy otherwise simply known as WEP. However
cases documenting WEP's security mechanism being breached in legitimate and
illegitimate cases have been published and are readily available on the Internet.
While wireless networks provide the freedom of mobility for users, this also
allows potential hackers to eavesdrop on unsuspecting wireless users. Or worse,
one could potentially hijack an access point and gain unauthorized access past
the wireless network and then into the wired internal network. Thus an intruder
who has hijacked an access point will be able to access critical data while hiding
safely outside the building. Knowledge and understanding of wireless networks
and of its security is a necessary step to be learnt if wireless networks are to be
deployed securely especially in congested urban settings.
Overview
Network administrators implement WEP as a security means for users
with wireless network capable devices that connect with access points; however
WEP is flawed and can not be used as an absolute means of security. Available
are applications that can sniff wireless traffic and view the contents of packets as
they are being transmitted through the air. Also available are applications that
can break WEP's security codes and mechanism which are readily available to
be downloaded off the Internet. These applications work by capturing enough
wireless packets and analyzing each one. Given enough time and resources,
data can be revealed and WEP keys can be cracked. Even worse, the capturing
of packets does not need to be within the same building. In fact it can be
anywhere within the coverage range of the wireless network hence providing a
great advantage for a potential intruder. Once a hacker has established
connection to an Access Point and has cracked WEP, the hacker is virtually
sitting inside a closed room in front of a victim's unoccupied computer. To make
matters worse, once the penetration has been discovered; capturing the culprit is
futile since they were never inside the building in the first place! By better
understanding the aspects of wireless networking security, better security
measures can take place. But before hand; it is best to understand whatWEP is,
how it works, why it fails, and what other measures can be implemented to
decrease the chances of attacks.
Research
The scope of this thesis involves a brief discussion of available wireless
protocols and what lies in the future with regards to securing computer networks
whether they are wired or wireless. Research documenting what is WEP, how it
works, and why it is flawed in terms of security will be discussed. This thesis will
also document ways of finding wireless networks using a personal laptop
computer or PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) armed with a wireless card and
knowledge of the Windows and Linux operating system. Also a list of available
programs available off the Internet will be briefly discussed and screen shots will
be provided showing what each program is capable of doing in terms of
potentially allowing an intruder to gain unlawful access from and into a wireless
network. Information pertaining to the steps needed in order to crack WEP will
be documented without creating a set of cookbook instructions. All the relevant
information researched off the Internet will be comprised into a guide needed for
someone to understand what the current forms of security exist for wireless
networks during the time of this writing. Second generation WEP (WEP2) will be
discussed and compared with first generation WEP as the hopes for this second
generation version will provide a more robust version to first generation WEP.
Alternative forms of security to WEP will be presented although none of them
have been yet implemented into the market during the time of writing this thesis.
Other alternative forms of existing and under development authentication and
encryption schemes will be discussed, although their original purpose may not
have been designed for Wi-Fi the concepts can be applied towards it. Based
upon all gathered research, this thesis will include personal recommendations of
setting up a wireless network in hopes to provide a more difficult setting for
intruders to gain of unlawful access based upon the current security mechanisms
and schemes available during the time of writing.
Why is wireless so important?
Planning for the future is an important step, which not only applies to
computing technology but along with all other aspects of life. Although wireless
is considered somewhat of a novelty during the time of this writing, in future time
the role of wireless is bound to play a much larger role in the world of computing
networks and beyond. According to Dr. Bernard Aboba of the Microsoft
Corporation, he predicts wireless systems by the end of the first decade in the
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century will consist of the following1:
A viable desktop NIC replacement
Wireless ISPs will happen
Community nets will happen
Adhoc networking will extend coverage dramatically
Dual 802.1 1/WAN NICs will be commonplace
Although they are only predictions, the probability of them actually occurring
seems very likely to happen given the boom in computer technology from the
early 1990's into the early 2000's. In the mean time during the time of this
writing, some network administrators may oppose wireless or some may simply
not want to deploy it. Based upon the above predictions, all network
administrators should be prepared to either embrace wireless or at least accept it
because wireless networking is currently only at its infancy and the future seems
to indicate that wireless is not going to go away anytime soon.
802.1 1 b verses 802.1 1 g
Popularity changes
During the course of writing this thesis, both IEEE wireless standards have
changed in availability, price, and popularity. When the writing of this thesis
began, 802.11b was gaining vast popularity over 802.11a and was readily
available in the retail market at a moderate price. Nearing the completion of this
thesis, 802.1 1g is fast gaining popularity over 802.11b and 802.11g's prices are
1
The Unofficial 802.11 Security Web Page. September 2003.
URL: http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/
approximately what the prices for 802.11b were when all writing began. As of
current time of this writing, 802.1 1b's prices are currently extremely affordable to
those interested in setting up a wireless network hence the rapid growth of
wireless networks especially in homes. However, for the purpose of this thesis,
the term Wi-Fi will be referred to as either 802.11b or 802. 11g. Fortunately, the
security measures used by both wireless standards are the same and will not
affect the rest of this thesis.
Comparison chart of 802. 1 1b verses 802. 1 1g along with 802. 1 1a2.
Wireless Standard 802.11a 802.11b 802.1 1g
Frequency 5.8 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz
Speed 54 Mbps 11 Mbps 54 Mbps
Range Shorter range than
802.1 1b and 802.1 1g
Good Range.
Better range than
802.11a
Good Range. Same range
as 802.11b. Better range
than 802.11a.
Popularity User base still
relatively small
Currently has the
largest user base
Expect this standard to
overtake 802.1 1b as the
standard of choice
Cost Most expensive Cheapest More expansive than
802.1 1b but cheaper
then 802.11a
2 Wireless LANAntennas. InPath Devices, Inc. 2003.
URL: http://www.wlanantennas.com/wireless_standard_comparison.htm
Benefits Excellent speed, Lowest price, The speed of 802.11a
unaffected by 2.4 excellent signal with the range of
GHz devices, can co range, coverage 802.1 1b, compatible with
exist with 802.11b penetrate most 802.11b networks and
and 802.1 1g walls, works with hotspots, excellent
networks public hotspots signal strength
Introduction to WEP
What is WEP
WEP stands for Wired Equivalent Privacy. Its purpose is to bring the
security of wired networks to Wi-Fi by preventing eavesdropping, the modification
of messages, and unauthorized access from illegitimate individuals. This is
accomplished through a policy of encryption and authentication. WEP's
encryption scheme is based upon a 64bit RC4 (stream cipher) random variation
encryption algorithm developed by cryptographer Ron Rivest. A stream cipher
independently ciphers or codes each byte separately without affecting other
bytes, and it can expand "a short key into an infinite pseudo-random key
stream."3 This encryption scheme will be further discussed shortly. The
authentication scheme used in WEP is like a handshake system between a
device such as an access point and another device capable of wireless
networking. There are two types of authentication schemes that WEP can use,
shared key and open key authentication. Shared key authentication is based
3 Borisov, Nikita; Goldberg, Ian; Wagner, David. Security of the WEP algorithm.
URL: http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html
upon a challenge/response algorithm while open key authentication does not use
a challenge/response algorithm. Both schemes will both be explained shortly.
How WEP encryption works
WEP encryption can be broken down into two components. After the
sender, usually an access point, initiates the encryption scheme algorithm; the
first component of WEP encryption begins. In order to encrypt the unsecured
plaintext, a process of constructing a shared secret key occurs. Once
completed, the result is a key size built of a 16 to 104bit key with an initialization
vector (IV) inserted in the beginning. An IV is a 24 bit long stream added to the
shared key. Its use is needed because WEP can only create four combinations
of shared keys, with only four combinations there runs a great possibility that the
same shared key will be reused. In order to prevent the reuse, an IV is a set of
randomly generated characters to be used with the shared keys to produce
further encrypted keys thus somewhat extending the shared key's lifetime of use.
This key will then be imported into a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
to create randomness "because computers are deterministic, starting the
sequence with the same seed always results in the same string of
numbers."4
The final product created is called a key stream ranging from 40 to 128 bits, the
next step is the creation of cipher text. As mentioned before, the actual
encryption is performed by the RC4 algorithm. Since the actual RC4 algorithm is
beyond the scope of this thesis, it will be very simply explained as a process of
4 Jack Ganssle andMichael Barr. Embedded Systems Dictionary [Online] CMP Books, 2003.
URL: http://80-library.books24x7.com.ezproxy.rit.edu/book/id_5099/viewer.asp?chunkid=130203038
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XORing ("a logical operation of comparing two binary bits"5) the original
unencrypted plaintext with the key stream to create cipher text.
The second component of WEP encryption involves protection against
modification to the cipher text, whether accidental or malicious. A 32-bit cyclic-
redundancy-check (CRC32) is calculated to provide some error checking. It is a
numeric value computed from bits in the cipher text and is attached to the end of
the packet before transmission. When the receiving end receives the cipher text,
it removes the CRC32 and recreates a new CRC32. The original CRC32 and the
new CRC32 are compared, if they both match then the cipher text was not
changed and is considered to be original and secure; or so it seems. This
window of opportunity for an exploit from this scenario will be discussed later on.
The following diagram shows an encrypted WEP frame after it completing the
first 2 steps on the WEP encryption process.6
Figure 1 : Encrypted WEP frame
- Plaintext >
Message CRC
XOR
Keystream =RC4(v.k)
V Ciphertext
Transmitted Data
Figure 1 : Encrypted WEP frame
5 Grogans, Candance; Bethea, Jackie; Hamdan, Issam. RC4 Encryption Algorithm: Algorithm Breakdown.
March 2000. URL: http://www.ncat.edu/~grogans/algorithm breakdown.htm
6 Loeb, Larry. What's up with WEP? Don't let it compromise your data. Secure Electronic Transactions.
April 2001. URL: http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/security/librarv/s-wep/?dwzone=securitv
11
A decryption process is initiated when the cipher text on the receiving side
is sent back to the sending side. To begin the decryption process, the same
steps used to create the cipher text will be reversed to recover the plaintext data.
The plaintext is recovered when the cipher text is XORed with a key stream
(WEP key, comprised of the IV and shared key). Deciphering cipher text, similar
to encrypting cipher text, involves performing a CRC32 error check to ensure
accuracy of the cipher text without mistake. Once the encryption phase has
been completed, the next phase will be authentication.
How shared key authentication works
Shared key authentication is a four-step process beginning with an access
point that receives a request for association from a wireless device. Actual
authentication does not begin until management frames are sent back and forth
between both ends to begin the process but once they do, the four authentication
steps are listed as the following:
1 . The client sends an association request
2. The access point receives the request and produces a random challenge
text to be sent to the client
3. The client receives the challenge text and encrypts its shared WEP key
and returns it back to the access point
4. The access point decrypts the challenge text with its own shared WEP key
and compares it with the original challenge text
If the returned decrypted challenge text from the client is the same with the
original challenge text sent from the access point, the client is then authenticated
with the access point. If the challenge text from the client is different from the
challenge text held by the access point, the client is not authenticated and the
frame/packet will be dropped. If the client for whatever reason does not have the
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shared WEP key, the cipher text (plaintext XORed with a key stream generated
during the WEP encryption process) would not have been exposed revealing any
plaintext. Since the plaintext has not been exposed, the authentication process
is said to be secure in theory or so it seems. This window of opportunity for an
exploit from this scenario will be discussed later on. Below is another version of
shared key authentication process shown in illustration form to provide another
view for the same notion just explained above.
AinticMH atiofl Frame
Aj'.'Tli:i'..H.|,j[' Rl'.JLTil
802 1 1 Wireless
LAN Aij.jpte'
2 AutheotiCdftJOft M.irriK 126 byteWEP
Cha lengs
J Atttfcmiication frame Encrypted
rh.j tinge .'.Hi .h,ir<f)-kp'y
B02 1 1 ]:,\lf\.-.:
LAN AcCfiii
Potnt
4 A;jtlwnliCdlio Rr'.ulr Sutr% r>
decrypted successfully oi Faituira
\ r
How open key authentication works
Unlike shared key authentication, open key is much simpler. When using
this authentication scheme without WEP enabled, any wireless capable device
can associate with an access point without the exchange of a challenge text to
be encrypted, decrypted, compared, checked for differences, and/or have
packets discarded. All that is needed for a wireless device to associate with an
access point is the access point's SSID. What an SSID is and how it can be
found will be further explained in the upcoming paragraphs. This scheme
provides less security due to the lack mutual authentication used and it is
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generally the default setting of most access points. If WEP is enabled, WEP's
own use of a shared key then becomes a pseudo authentication method which
works transparently or indirectly when used in conjunction with open key
authentication.
However despite having no actual authentication mechanism when using
open key authentication and with WEP enabled, one person from an Internet
message board actually recommended the use of open key authentication for
greater security over shared key authentication when both are to be used in
conjunction with WEP. Their explanation is as follows:
"Shared Key authentication would be more secure if WEP wasn't so
'easy'
to crack... It's the authentication process, alone, that makes
Shared Key less secure...Open Authentication, when used with
WEP, is more secure... the client will still be able to authenticate, as
long as the SSIDs match, but unless the client has a matching
WEP key it will not be able to pass data to or from the AP. This
scenario makes it much harder for a 'hacker' to obtain the WEP key
via a
sniffer/WEPcracker."7
Of course when using open key authentication, one should turn off SSID
broadcasting on the access point to limit the chance of unwanted wireless
network discoveries and associations. The SSID broadcast acts like a beacon
which informs all wireless capable devices within range that an access point is
around and available. Third party software, which will be explained later on, can
be used to detect available wireless networks by listening for an access point's
SSID broadcast.
Enabling WEP
7 BroadBandReports.com: ForumsHardware By BrandLinksys. Decemeber 2002.
URL: http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,5190779~root=equip,16~mode=flat
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Enabling WEP first involves selecting which level of encryption is wanted
or needed; 40, 64, and 128 are the most common bit levels during the time of this
writing. As the higher number of bits increases so does the level of security.
However, if an access point is capable of supporting 128bit WEP encryption and
the wireless NIC on the client end only supports up to 64bit WEP encryption,
64bit WEP encryption will be the final encryption level used between the access
point and wireless node. Next, up to 4 private keys need to be created before
the authentication process can begin. Depending on the model and manufacture
of the access point; the key to be entered may be in the form of ASCII
characters, hexadecimal numbers, or a pass phrase (text). The following screen
capture is an example of a home-marketed wireless router with WEP configured
and enabled.
Enhanced 2,4GMzWireless Router
Home
These are the wireless settings for the APfAccess Potnt)Portion
SSID AP1
Channel 1 "
WEP Enabled 0 Disabled
WEP Encryption 54Blt v
Key Type HEX v
Key1 ''-. ABCDEF1234
Key2 O 0000000000
Key3 :'/.< 0000000000
key4 O 0000000000
Wireless
j j 0
Apply Cancel Help
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The following screen capture shows a computer equipped with a wireless card
running the Windows XP operating system waiting for a WEP key to be entered.
The WEP key to be entered is the same as the one shown in the above screen
capture, it is needed in order for the wireless capable computer to associate with
the above access point.
D-Link AirPlus
The following wireless network(s) are available. To access a
wireless network, select it from the list, and then click Connect:
Available wireless networks:
i API
This wireless network
access this network.
Network key:
requires the use of a network key WEP). To
type the key, then click Connect.
? Enable IEEE
If you are having diffi
802.1 x authentication for this network
:ulty connecting to a network, click .Advanced
| Advanced... Connect Cancel
WEP is flawed
Why Wi-Fi is insecure
Four basic groupings of vulnerability exist as to the reason why Wi-Fi is
considered to be lacking in terms of security. The first reason lies in Wi-Fi's
physical structure or having the lack of one. Wi-Fi is a "wireless Ethernet
networking
technology."8 Unlike traditional networking technology which
transmits data through wires and cables, Wi-Fi transmits data through open air.
While this form of transmission has the greatest advantage of allowing users to
become mobile and dynamic, this greatest advantage also results in Wi-Fi's
Wireless Ethernet Networking with 802.11b, an overview.
URL: http://www.homenethelp.eom/802.l lb/index.asp
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greatest shortcoming in the form of security. By default, these packets of data
travel through the air in often plain and unencrypted text. Given the right
software and hardware, these packets can be 'sniffed' and captured to be further
analyzed to retrieve the original data being sent.
The second reason why Wi-Fi's security measure in the form of WEP is
considered flawed lies in the IV (initiation vector which was explained during
WEP encryption). It is sent in clear text as in it is not encrypted. As soon as
wireless cards are powered on with WEP enabled, most cards assign the IV an
initial value of one and then augment those values by one each time the WEP
key is passed between the access point and client. Because the IV is only a 24
bit value, it can be reused up to a total of 16,777,216 times before running out of
different values. Although this may seem a large number, in an environment that
can move data at maximum bit rate continually throughout the day, six hours is
approximately how long it will take for all values to be used. After this event,
most APs will reset the IV to back one and begin the same cycle over again.
Since the IV is transmitted with every packet sent to the destination, this leaves it
very susceptible to reuse exploits. After enough rounds of collecting ciphered
text encrypted with the same IV, the shared WEP key can be recovered. This
process will further explained shortly. The worst part being, most shared WEP
keys by default are set to be the same as the SSID. Although it may require
collecting 15 to 25 billion bytes of data, the possibility is there. What makes the
use of IVs worse, of the 16,777,216 combinations, about 2% of them are
considered weak IVs. A week IV is known to reveal some information about what
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they are encrypting. Fortunately, most home and small business wireless
networks will not generate enough wireless traffic in a day. Although this may
possibly take months to hack, if the data is critical enough someone with enough
patience will always be around to foil any wireless network.
The third reason why Wi-Fi's security measures are considered flawed
involves the challenge text sequence when association first occurs, this was
introduced during the paragraph on shared WEP key authentication. There is an
instance of vulnerability during the challenge text exchange when using shared
key authentication, which was hinted earlier above. This vulnerability occurs if a
malicious intruder were to intercept the initial unencrypted challenge text along
with the challenge text encrypted with the shared WEP key. If the malicious
intruder were able to capture these two critical streams of data packets, there is a
chance that the secret shared WEP key can be obtained by reverse engineering
them by XORing the two together. Once obtained, the intruder can use the WEP
key to associate with an unsuspecting wireless network. This is possible due to
an inherited flaw used by the RC4 encryption algorithm.
The fourth reason over concern about WEP lies in the CRC which was
introduced and hinted in the paragraph regarding WEP's encryption process.
Unfortunately, this method of error checking may not always prevent data
packets from being altered or modified. By using the same XOR exploit with IVs,
this vulnerability allows the packet to be sent to another destination. This can
occur between the user client and an access point, if the destination IP address
can be determined in the packet. The access point will decrypt the packet and
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forward it on to the changed IP address. Although TCP forwarding is beyond the
scope of this thesis, it will be said that the TCP checksum will not be checked
until it reaches the forged destination. A more detailed explanation of using this
exploit will be discussed later.
Combined with these four factors; a determined intruder can sit outside
the building, usually in a parked van, within Wi-Fi range capturing wireless traffic.
In the safety of such a van, the intruder can collect enough wireless packets
searching specifically for IV reusal and/or challenge text exchange with the
malicious intent of obtaining the shared WEP key. Once obtained, the hacker
can redirect packets to forward them to another location usually belonging to the
hacker themselves. However, despite the possibility of WEP being hackable, the
amount of work required to crack it may sometimes not be worth the trouble. If
the contents or information inside the wireless network is of less value, this may
cause an intruder to find another wireless network with easier entry access.
Thus WEP should be used when deploying Wi-Fi but one should only consider it
to be like a lock on a door, it will only keep honest people out.
History of 802. 1 1 Security Vulnerability
timeline9
October 2000 - Jesse Walker was one of the first people to identify several
of the problems in WEP. Jesse wrote a paper for the 802.11 committee
entitled "Unsafe at any key size: An Analysis of the WEP
encapsulation"
January 2001 - Researchers at the University of California at Berkely
independently released a paper describing the problems with WEP.
March 2001 - Jesse also made a presentation to the 802.15.3 committee
describing some of the problems with security in 802.1 1 .
9 Arbaugh, William. Wireless Research: 802.11 Security Vulnerabilities.
URL: http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/wireless.html
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May 2001 - Recently, we found a new cryptographic attack against both
WEP and WEP2 (a proposed enhancement to WEP) that works
regardless of the IV size, and we presented our findings to the 802.11
subgroup on security at the May 2001 Orlando meeting.
June 2001 - Tim Newsham found a problem in the algorithm that some
vendors used to automatically generate WEP keys. He also built code to
perform dictionary attacks againstWEP intercepted traffic.
August 2001 - Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir find a flaw in the
RC4 key setup algorithm which results in a total recovery of the secret
key. Implementing the attack requires the collection of traffic passively.
February 2002 Arunesh Mishra and I describe several design flaws in the
combination of the IEEE 802.1X and IEEE 802.11 protocols that permit
man-in-the-middle and session hijacking attacks.
Different types of WEP attacks
To reiterate, the purpose of this thesis is not to provide a set of cookbook
instructions on how to crack WEP. Instead the goal is to present concepts of
wireless security, its flaws, attacks, and tools available which were specifically
written for wireless networks. The following categories are statistical listings of
the ways hackers are attacking wireless networks. Later on, software tools will
be presented only to provide information about using them based upon
information that is widely available off the Internet. Further explanation of setting
up, implementation, and results is left to the discretion of those who implement
and experiment with them. The author takes no responsibility in the results of
those actions.
WEP is not something that should be cracked by anyone who is not willing
to devote the time for research, analyzing packets, and an appreciation for a
20
challenge. The following lists four different kinds of possible documented
attacks10:
Passive attacks to decrypt traffic based on statistical analysis
Active attack to inject new traffic from unauthorized mobile stations, based
on known plaintext
Active attacks to decrypt traffic, based on tricking the access point
Dictionary-building attack that, after analysis of about a day's worth of
traffic, allows real-time automated decryption of all traffic
Passive attacks by decrypting traffic involve an eavesdropper intercepting
wireless traffic specifically looking for an IV collision to occur. An IV collision is
when a reusal of the same IV occurs. By exploiting this vulnerability, the intruder
has initiated an attack. This type of attack is the most common and was
described in the above paragraph.
Active attacks to inject new traffic occur after successfully accomplishing
the above passive attack. Once the IV has been exploited, the hacker can
correctly assemble an encrypted packet and sent it to the access point. Because
the access point will recognize this packet as being genuine, security up to this
point has been treacherously breached and the intruder has gained control of the
hijacked access point. In short, the hacker can create any genuine packet he or
she wishes in a process called spoofing with the known key stream orWEP key.
Active attacks from both ends to decrypt traffic takes the above mentioned
attack one step further. In this attack, an intruder maliciously spoofs a packet to
include a new destination IP address different from where the packet was
10 Borisov, Nikita; Goldberg, Ian; Wagner, David. Security of the WEP algorithm.
URL: http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html
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originally intended to go. This can be accomplished by flipping the appropriate
bits in the packet header of a Wi-Fi frame (very similar to the frames used in
Ethernet), as it was briefly mentioned in the paragraph regarding why WEP is
considered flawed. This is dangerous because the access point will decrypt the
packet, not knowing an intrusion has occurred, and the contents can be easily
revealed since it is being received in plaintext. If an intruder has enough
knowledge to change the TCP header, the destination port can be changed to
port 80. By going through port 80, most firewalls are configured to allow all traffic
to pass by with minimal security because the World Wide Web uses port 80.
Since most wireless networks also have Internet access, this is a very easy
means of transferring stolen packets to not only to the attacker's machine but to
those in hostile foreign countries as well.
Dictionary-building attacks involve building a decryption table of all
combinations of available IVs and WEP keys. When enough IVs can be
collected and the plaintext for packets can be determined, a hacker can calculate
the RC4 key stream and predict how the next encrypted packet will be
assembled. With this key stream in hand, the hacker can decrypt all the other
packets using the same IV. Over time combined with an ample amount of space,
approximately 15 gigabits, a table can be populated which can decrypt all
packets being sent through the unsuspecting wireless network. Although
possible, this is the least type of attack performed due to the large amount of
resources and time needed and is also the most difficult to execute.
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How to find an access point
The first step to potentially hack into a wireless network is to find an
access point. With the price of wireless access points and wireless cards
dropping in price, access points are constantly popping up in buildings,
campuses, and even homes. War driving is a new occurrence that can be simply
described as "driving around looking for unsecured wireless networks."11
Software in conjunction with a wireless network card can be used to listen for an
access point's SSID broadcast to locate areas within range that contain wireless
networks. The act of actual wardriving involves driving, biking, or walking around
in congested urban areas with a laptop or PDA with wireless capabilities. A GPS
(Global Positional System) receiver is considered extremely helpful as it will
record each localized wireless network and create a map or zone of 'hotspots'.
Equipment needed to find an access point
Laptop computer or PDA capable of Wi-Fi for ease of mobility and
compact size
Wireless card with a prism2 chipset or an Orinoco for the most software
compatibility
A laptop battery capable of long term runs, wireless cards use more
power, or a constant power supply (car battery DC inverter)
Microsoft Windows operating system although knowledge of the Linux
operating system is preferable due to the abundance of software
specifically written for Linux
Possibly an external antenna mount on the wireless card for increased
and better reception and range
11 Shipley, Pete. Wardriving.com.
URL: http://www.wardriving.com/about.php
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War driving tools which can find access points; i.e. Windows XP,
Netstumbler, or ApSniff . The list continues
A GPS receiver attached to a laptop or PDA, the GPS can be "configured
to emit NMEA (National Marine Electronic Association) standard
positioning data, and feed that data to the computer"12
The picture shown below is an example of a homemade external antenna,
instructions can be found here.13 With such a homemade antenna built, signals
that a wireless card can pick up can be greatly increased without a tremendous
expense for those on a budget. This equates to being able to locate the same
access point from a location farther away then without having the external
antenna.
Windows XP
Windows XP, the operating system from the Microsoft Corporation, has
built in capabilities to find access points when equipped with a wireless card.
Any wireless card will work as long as XP has a driver available for it. Of all the
12
Duntemann, Jeff. JeffDunetemann's Drive-By Wi-Fi Guide: Chapter 18: Going Wardriving.
[Online] Paraglyph Press, 2003.
URL: http://80-librarv.books24x7.com.ezproxy.rit.edu/book/id 5243/viewer.asp?bookid=5243&chunkid
=0980682783
13 Flickenger, Rob. Antenna on the Cheap (er, Chip). Permalink,My 2001.
URL: http://www.oreillvnet.com/cs/weblog/view/wlg/448
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access point finding software, this was the easiest to use since it is built into the
operating system. The following is a screen capture of what happens when XP
finds an access point. Note that since the access point found does not have
WEP enabled, anyone who is within range just has to check the checkbox and
click the Connect button to associate with that access point unless other security
means have been established.
DLinkAirPlus
The following wireless network(s) are available. To access a
wireless network, select it from the list, and then click Connect
Available wireless networks:
i
This wireless network is not secure Because a network
J \ key [WEP] is not used for authentication or for data
encryption, data sent over this network might be subject to
unauthorised access.
I | Allow rne to connect to the selected wireless network,
even though it is not secure
If you are having difficulty connecting to a network, clickAdvanced
Advanced... Cancel
Netstumbler
Netstumbler is 3rd party software used by "security folks wanting to check
that their corporate LAN isn't wide open Systems, admins wanting to check
coverage of their Wireless LAN, gatherers of demographic information about
802.11 popularity, drive-by snoopers, overly curious
bystanders."14 Based upon
all the message boards found regarding War Driving, Netstumbler is the most
popular tool used for finding access points. It can be found and downloaded
from http://www.netstumbler.com. Unlike most otherWi-Fi area locators, not only
14 Netstumbler.com: NetStumbler.com ForumsFAQ'sNetStumblerOfficial NetStumbler Version
0.3 FAQ. July 2002.
URL: http://forums.netstumbler.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=2875
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does Netstumbler run on Linux/Unix platforms but it also has a version able to
run on the Windows platform.
When researching among Internet message boards, many others had
compatibility issues with past versions Netstumbler due to the lack on wireless
cards support. As of Netstumbler version .3, the following wireless cards are
supported as taken straight off their website:15
Lucent Technologies WaveLAN/IEEE (Agere ORiNOCO)
Dell TrueMobile 1 150 Series (PCMCIA and mini-PCI)
Avaya Wireless PC Card
Toshiba Wireless LAN Card (PCMCIA and built-in)
Compaq WL1 10
Cabletron/Enterasys Roamabout Elsa Airlancer MC-1 1
ARtem ComCard 1 1 Mbps
IBM High Rate Wireless LAN PC Card
1 stWave 1 ST-PC-DSS1 1 1S, DSS1 1 1G, DSS1 1 ES, DSS1 1 EG
With all the now available cards supported and its ease of use, it is no wonder
why Netstumbler seems to be the most popular access point finding software
used. The following screen capture shows an access point found.
15 NetStumbler.com
URL: http://www.netstumbler.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=FAO&file=index&myfaq=ves&
id_cat=l&categories=Official+NetStumbler+Version+0.3+FAQ#3
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* Network Stumbler [200301 1 2202503]
\S\ File Edit V|e Device
l_J J
'5"
Channels
-J- SSIDs
Y Filters
Mal | SSID j Vendor [ Type [ SNR
-J-004005BA1211 API D-Link AP
Sign.. ] Noi . | SNR+ |j First Seen | LaslSe... ; Beacon lnterval_
n 100 100 8 25 04 P.. 8 28 51
Ready 1/1
Unfortunately the above sample only provides one access point. In order to gain
a sample of an area with a large abundance of more access points that can be
found by Netstumbler, a trip to the University of Tennessee Knoxville was made
where the sample is documented as follows:
i Network StMmbler -20030126135435]
[J] File Edit View Device Window Help
::: Iff '?o eg y t> % ef * y \
"S'J Channels MAC | SSID N ame i Ch | Vendor Ty . | En... j SN : Sign . | Nor SN. | La
-
-X SSIDs J-00022D28B97D Agere (Lucent.) Orinoco AP -100 -100 0
+ -d. -ii 00601 D023A00 Agere (Lucent)WaveLAN AP -100 -100 0
- Y Fillers J-00022D1 D127C Agere (Lucent) Orinoco AP -100 -100 0
, / Encryption Off J-00022D28B97A Agere (Lucent) Orinoco AP -100 -100 0
H Encryption On
"5" ESS (AP)
"S"
IBSS (Peer)
"A" CFPollable
"J" Short Preamble
,_/ Default SSID
dfc 00601 D023900 Agere (Lucent)WaveLAN AP -100 -100 u
& 00601 D01 3700 Agere (Lucent)WaveLAN AP -100 -1 00 0
it 00601 D023800 Agere (Lucent)WaveLAN AP -100 -100 0
-i 00601 D023700 Agere (Lucent)WaveLAN AP -100 -100 0
J-00022D213636
J-00022D213631
Agere (Lucent) Orinoco
Agere (Lucent) Orinoco
AP
AP
-100
-100
-1 00
-100
0
0
it00022D28B69E Agere (Lucent) Orinoco AP -100 -100 0
at00022D2134C0 Agere (Lucent) Orinoco AP -100 -100 0
-d-00022D21324B
Aqere (Lucent) Orinoco AP -100 -100 0
ApSniff
ApSniff is another tool that can be used in the art of wardriving. Unlike
Netstumbler, which also works on the Linux/Unix platform, ApSniff is limited to
only Windows 2000 and XP. Not only is it limited to Window 2000/XP,
it supports
a much smaller range of wireless cards which must be a prism 2 chipset. It can
be found and downloaded at http://www.bretmounet.com/ApSniff/index.asp. The
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following is screen capture right off their website.
-T-Apsmri
Sc-anReuils | Scan Lc-j | Network CadConfigualion | Optois |
*l
APMACAckkeu I SSID I Oil SL lANLlWEP
00-50-18-06-81-BA BREtMOUNET COM ? 63 9 ^
I^^HH^^H
Cunert Channel 7
|: Scanning
_j|
OK. Cancel Help
It was not installable due to the lack of a prism 2 chipset (a D-link Tl chipset was
the only card available at the time of writing). Given the lack of operating
systems and wireless cards support, the author does not recommend this tool at
the time of this writing unless more supportive features are added in.
Is Wardriving legal?
As of the current time of this writing, no exact answer could be found.
Some say that simply driving around looking for places where wireless networks
exist especially while having no malicious motive cannot be considered illegal.
However, if one were to war drive for the purpose of hoping to find a wireless
network to gain free services such as Internet, then one could constitute an
unlawful act. As the progression of war driving intensifies, it is only a matter of
time before laws are written to deal with how far a war driver can go before the
intent becomes criminal. One case was unofficially documented where a war
driver from an Internet message board was ticketed in New York City when his
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laptop was mounted on the dashboard of his car; the officer wrote the person a
ticket for driving with an obscured view but did not ask for what purpose was his
laptop being used for. During the time of this writing, the author gives the advice
to those who choose to war drive - Do not make it obvious and do not get
caught.
Wireless Traffic and WEP cracking tools
The following next paragraphs discuss software tools that were written to
break into wireless networks. All information was researched and taken directly
from various venders' websites and 'the word on the streets' during the time of
this writing. The basis of operation of these tool lies in the published paper
entitled Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4 written by Fluhrer,
Mantin, and Shamir which can be viewed in its entirely
here.16 The fundamentals
of these tools lies in the weak IV that will eventually be used both in the
challenge text sequence when association first occurs and during passive packet
capturing which was explained earlier in this paper. Fortunately speaking, more
information could not be found on the Internet publicly regarding the use of such
tools. Most Internet message boards do not condone the discussion of using
such tools and are actively monitored by moderators who will delete such
discussions. Unfortunately, while these public forums are monitored; all various
hacking websites which contain very revealing information can be retrieved. The
author makes no reference to these types of websites only other than the fact
that they exist.
http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/rc4_ksaproc.pdf
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Ethereal
Ethereal is a network traffic-sniffing tool, available at
http://www.ethereal.com. It is described as being "a free network protocol
analyzer for Unix and Windows. It allows you to examine data from a live network
or from a capture file on disk. You can interactively browse the capture data,
viewing summary and detail information for each packet. Ethereal has several
powerful features, including a rich display filter language and the ability to view
the reconstructed stream of a TCP session."17 However while its Windows
version can perfectly sniff wired traffic, its capabilities to sniff wireless traffic on a
Windows platform was faulty or so it seemed. After experimenting with sniffing
wireless traffic, the only types of traffic Ethereal could sniff were wireless
broadcast packets. A search for an official answer in Ethereal's website could
not be found. After posting the question/problem on a message forum for
wireless sniffers, the answer was unofficially answered as:
"Ethereal is not the problem with sniffing wireless traffic in
Windows, it's the wireless NIC drivers. That's why Wanderer
mentioned the use of wildpackets drivers. Ethereal does support
802.11 which I use regularly, but the wireless NIC drivers for
windows will not pass all of the network traffic.
The drivers provided by the Wireless NIC vendors do not support
monitor mode (if they do, it's not documented). Monitor mode is
necessary to capture wireless traffic from stations other then your
own."18
Thus to use Ethereal to sniff wireless traffic, it should be installed on the Linux
operating system platform where its drivers are capable of supporting monitor
17 Ethereal.com
URL: http://www.ethereal.com
18 NetStumbler.com: NetStumbler.com ForumsSoftwareMISCCan Ethereal sniff all wireless
traffic? February 2003.
URL: http://forums.netstumbler.com/showthread.php?s=&postid=43582#post43582
30
mode. Unfortunately due to the lack of Linux knowledge and the availability of
drivers for D-link's Tl chipset wireless card for the Linux operating system during
the time of writing, the experiment could not be conducted and thus no screen
captures are available.
Kismet
Kismet is another wireless tool used for sniffing wireless traffic. Its
description is best taken straight from their website as:
"Kismet is an 802.1 1 wireless network sniffer - this is different from
a normal network sniffer (such as Ethereal or tcpdump) because it
separates and identifies different wireless networks in the area.
Kismet works with any 802.11b wireless card which is capable of
reporting raw packets (rfmon support), which include any prism2
based card (Linksys, D-Link, Rangelan, etc), Cisco Aironet cards,
and Orinoco based cards. Kismet also supports the WSP100
802.11b remote sensor by Network Chemistry and is able to
monitor 802.1 1a networks with cards which use the ar5k chipset."19
Once again due to a lack on Linux knowledge and the lack of available
Linux drivers, the following Kismet screen capture was taken off the Internet
which reveals information about some wireless network:
rj-Networks I [--Info i
1 SSID T N Ch Data LLC Crypt Hk Flags 1 1 Ntwrks 1
1 linksys ft Y 01 0 97 0 0 II 33 1
1 HarlanNet ft N 01 1 188 0 0 II Pckets 1
1 . Physics Network ft Y 01 9 36 3 0 II 6145 1
1 . Travis ft N 01 0 9 0 0 1 1 Cryptd 1
1 . Hamilton MS2 A N 01 4 17 0 0 II 4 1
1 . Hamilton-Steve and Kin's r ft N 01 0 4 0 0 II Weak 1
1 . Hheeler MS 2 ft N 01 2 7 0 0 II 0 1
1 . WaveLAN Network ft N 03 0 15 0 0 1 1 Noise 1
1 1 David's Room ft N 01 9 82 0 0 ft C II 138 1
1 . Hope 302 ft Y 05 3 24 0 0 1 1 Discrd 1
1 . <no ssid> H N 00 17 17 0 0 II 407 1
1 1 HirelessHoiieNetwork ft N 01 0 84 0 0
1 I harbor+wave ft N 06 0 27 0 0
1 1 the new ftLT ft N 06 0 91 0 0 1 1 Elapsd 1
L_
1 1 000203 1
J LH-M-S-1
[-"Status
-" ~
I Reoving Inactive network 'Apple Network
391c2e' from display list.
I Detected new network 'the new ftLT' bssid 00:04:5A:D0:03:F5 HEP N Ch 6
I Removing inactive network
'default' front display list.
I Detected new network
' harbor*wave ' bssid 00:40:96 :44:15:C7 HEP N Ch 6
'
Kismet.com
URL: http://www.kismetwireless.net/index.shtml
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AirSnort
"AirSnort is a wireless LAN (WLAN) tool which recovers encryption keys.
AirSnort operates by passively monitoring transmissions, computing the
encryption key when enough packets have been gathered."20 Some have
claimed with the use of AirSnort, most wireless networks can be hacked into
within two weeks or less. Since it works by monitoring wireless signals passively
without interference, it is unlikely a network manager would be able to detect the
attack as it is happening. While the authors state the goal of releasing AirSnort is
not intended for malicious use, it is intended to push WEP standards higher so a
more secure method can be created and established. The following is a screen
capture of what a running version would look like as it is capturing wireless
packets.
X-AirSnort
File E8S Sailings Help
. cfianmei IF 4
Metwisrt- device 1 6M0
Card )>/&* Icrifti
40 in! cci bre3dt> pj~"-i
126 Sitwart breach 17 4
BSSID Name WEP Lastsee'i LssSI
H
a6 5?HV-'^Mc<:
Chan Paclelt ErKrypree
On i TOO
15)48:00
JO 1.0 00
jo c i oo
nn r n nn
FX
Sart
WEPCrack
WEPCrack is one of the more common tools to obtaining a WEP key, it
can be described as "a tool that cracks 802.11 WEP encryption keys using the
latest discovered weakness of RC4 key
scheduling."21It is interesting to note
that WEPCrack's rival is Airsnort. "WEPCrack was the first publicly available
20 The Shmoo Group: AirSnort Homepage.
URL: http://airsnort.shmoo.com/
21 SourceForge.net: Project: wepcrack: Summary
URL: http://sourceforge.net/projects/wepcrack/
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code that demonstrated... the attack described by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir in
the paper Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4."22 WEPCrack
was released in August 2001 , a week later Airsnort was released but had more
functions and features. Based upon the little information that could be found off
public Internet forums, WEPCrack and Airsnort are the two most common
programs for someone wanting to break into wireless networks.
dwepcrack
Dwepcrack is yet another WEP cracking tool available on the Internet.
While searching through Internet message forums, it is rumored to offer more
and better attacks than WEPCrack. Similar to Kismet, it too uses a pcap format.
Below is a screen capture and in the author's opinion, this has the best looking
interface compared to all others. Unfortunately, this program was not commonly
mentioned when search through Internet discussion forums during the time of
this writing so its ability to crackWEP through its reputation was not found.
hlkariobalthasar "f dwepcrack -w "'/log
* dwepcrack v8.4 by hlkari <hlkar iedachbederi.cort> *
* Copyright (c) Dachbeden Labs 2882 [htfp://dgchb8den,
reading in captured ivs, snap headers, and samples,..
total packets: 586*56
8: 22/768 keys (! )
1 : 3535/1 31 328 keys ( ! )
2: 5459/1 97376 keys (!)
3: 5424/197128 keys (! 1
4: 9313/328783 keys (! 1
(!) insufficient i'.'s. Must have > 68 for each key (!)
(!) probability of success for each key with (!) < 8.5 (!)
warning up the grinder...
packet length: 44
in it vector: 58: f 7: 26
default tK key: e
wep keys successfully cracked!
hlkar iebalthasar "*S
22 WEPCrack.
URL: http://wepcrack.sourceforge.net
33
Comments found regarding WEP
While searching off the Internet for personal opinions regarding the
effectiveness and security ability of WEP, the vast majority of articles all favor the
dismay of WEP. Below are two opinions of out many, the first unofficial and not
anti-WEP while the second is official and non pro-WEP. They were chosen to try
to represent an unbiased opinion.
In favor ofWEP
The following insert represents an educated opinion regarding the
usefulness of implementing WEP as a security measure in a wireless network
found in an Internet newsgroup. Although the person does admit WEP is not the
best solution, it should be used regardless as it does provide some sort of
protection over not using it at all. It is an interesting point of view, probably
representing the majority of hackers/intruders out there.
"Has anyone here actually cracked WEP? The way every
regards WEP makes me think that none here has even attempted
it. For those of you who have not attempted to crack it, it is not as
easy as you think. First, it took us quite a lot of recoding just to
get Airsnort to work. For the actual cracking of WEP.. .40 bit WEP
generally takes over a week of continuous scanning to crack the
key. In order to crack 128 bit WEP, I am assuming it will take
several weeks. To crack WEP, you have to scan for "Interesting
Packets". Now my roommate and I have been attempting to
crack WEP for research purposes. In the 5 days we have been
doing this, we have come up with 108 "Interesting Packets". The
program says you need at least 400 Interesting Packets to crack
40 bit WEP. It also says that you need about 4000 to crack 128
bit WEP. Now the next thing you have to realize is that we have
picked these packets because we have a laptop with a wireless
card connected to a shoutcast server through winamp. This
means that it is downloading 24/7. Most wireless networks are not
active 24/7 and are not downloading nearly as much as we are.
So how long do you really think that it will take for a hacker to
crack 128 bit WEP? He would probably have to come back every
day for the 8 or 10 hours the company is working for like 3-6
months in order to get enough "Interesting Packets". I don't know
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about you people, but the script kiddies I know are not going to
put that much time and effort into cracking a wireless network
when they could drive 2 or 3 more blocks and find a nice wide
open network...WEP is not what you should rely on, but don't
discard it as useless. Use it with whatever other security
measures you have.
The more I try and crack WEP, the bigger the supporter I become
of it. It is not perfect, but it will keep out most people. Hope this
helps,
Vinny"23
In opposition of WEP
With that opinion given, here is another officially documented opinion
regarding WEP. They describe WEP as obviously being insecure but at the
same time, they do not ridicule it and present the facts in an unbiased fashion.
The people at AT&T Labs recommended the following for people using wireless
networks whether or not WEP is enabled or not:24
Assume that the link layer offers no security
Use higher-level security mechanisms such as IPsec and SSH for
security, instead of relying on WEP
Treat all systems that are connected via 802.11 as external.
Place all access points outside the firewall.
Assume that anyone within physical range can communicate on
the network as a valid user. Keep in mind that an adversary may
utilize a sophisticated antenna with much longer range than found
on a typical 802.1 1 PC card
With the previous two comments presented, this thesis gives the
conclusion that in order to secure a wireless network - implementing WEP is only
23 http://lists.bawug.org/pipermail/wireless/2001-December/004219.html
24 Stubblefield, Adam; Ioannidis, John; Rubin, Aviel. Using the Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir Attack to
Break WEP Revision 2. August 2001.
URL: http://www.cs.rice.edu/~astubble/wep/wep_attack.pdf
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part of the equation. More tips and techniques to secure wireless networks in
relation to WEP being enabled or disabled will be presented later on.
WEP2 (Second Generation WEP)
WEP2 verses WEP
Bernard Aboba, of the Microsoft Corporation, presented a revised
version of WEP in May of 2001 to correct the published known security flaws of
the original version. His presentation only glazed the tip of the iceberg but he
revealed that the IV of WEP2 would be increased to 128 bits. Although this may
seem like a drastic increase from 24 to 128 bits, WEP2 will suffer from the same
IV reuse as first generation WEP. Unfortunately, due to the need of backward
compatibility, WEP2 cannot be an entirely new form of wireless security. "Since
many encryption processes are done using ASIC chips, it will be difficult to
upgrade existing base stations and PC cards. It is possible to run patches to
enable existing systems to adapt to WEP2, but researchers, such as those from
UC Berkeley and University of Marylandas well as IEEE 802.11 working group
members such as Intelare not optimistic that WEP2 will raise the bar for WLAN
security."25 However, "According to Aboba, the only good news is that real-time
decryption of WEP2 data streams - necessary to eavesdropping on data
exchanges as they take place - will be significantly more difficult, due to the
increase size of the IV key
space."26
25 Phan, Seamus. 802.1 lb Update: Stepping Up Your WLAN Security. Networkmagazineindia.
URL: http://www.networkmagazineindia.com/200112/focus3.htm
26 Stark, Thorn. It came Out of the sky. WEP2, credibility Zero. 2001
URL: http://users.rcn.com/thomst/wireless003.html
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Future of WEP2
So despite the 'improvements' that were presented, the question is still
what future will be in store for WEP2? One author describes it as "It needs to be
replaced with something fundamentally different; something that is designed from
the ground up to provide robust key generation and management, sturdy bulk
encryption, authentication and data integrity mechanisms, and a high degree of
transparency for the end
user."27 But until a new robust security mechanism is
available, network administrators will have to make due with what is available
whether they choose to use WEP, wait forWEP2, or even use no form of WEP.
Alternatives to WEP/WEP2
WPA (Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess)
With the known vulnerabilities of WEP exposed and a dismal prediction
regarding the future of WEP2, other alternatives must be made available. WPA
is the result of the Wi-Fi Alliance working in conjunction with IEEE "to bring
strongly enhanced, interoperable Wi-Fi security to market in the first quarter of
2003... that strongly increase the level of data protection and access control for
existing and future wireless LAN systems...designed to run on existing hardware
as a software
upgrade."28As of time of this writing which occurred after the first
quarter of 2003, the latest information regarding WPA to be found was off
www.wi-
fi.org. Michael Disabato, a Senior Analyst of the Burton Group, gave a 40 minute
presentation entitled Wi-Fi Protected Access: Locking Down the Link in June
27 Stark, Thorn. It came Out of the sky. WEP2, credibility Zero. 2001
URL: http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/security/library/wi-sky3.html?dwzone=security
28 Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess. Wi-Fi Alliance. October 2002.
URL: http://www.weca.net/OpenSection/pdf/Wi-Fi_Protected_Access_Overview.pdf
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2003. The recorded web-cast recording and presentation can be viewed from
the same site listed above.29
What makes WPA unique from WEP is how data encryption is improved
by the use of a Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP). With WEP, a short IV is
considered one of much vulnerability because short keys can be cracked easier
than longer ones. TKIP uses a 48bit IV to combat that vulnerability, not only is
the IV longer but also has a couple new functions. "TKIP provides important data
encryption enhancements including a per-packet key mixing function, a message
integrity check (MIC) named Michael, an extended initialization vector (IV) with
sequencing rules, and a re-keying mechanism. Through these enhancements,
TKIP addresses WEP's known vulnerabilities."30 Michael prevents forged
messages from penetrating the wireless network. It does this by adding "a
message-integrity check to data packets sent over the network. Originally
intended for on-the-fly integrity checking on legacy systems, Michael produces
the desired results without involving computationally intense
operations."31 With
a re-keying mechanism unlike WEP where an administrator would have to
manually change the encryption key, TKIP can scramble keys with a hashing
algorithm and adds an integrity check to ensure that no tampering has occurred.
For every 10,000 frames sent where data is transmitted wirelessly, new keys are
29 Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess. Wi-Fi Alliance. 2003
URL: http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/protected_access.asp?
30 Wi-Fi Protected Access. Wi-Fi Alliance. October 2002.
http://www.weca.net/OpenSection/pdf/Wi-Fi_Protected_Access_Overview.pdf
31 Loeb, Larry. Roaming charges: Out with the WEP, in with the WPA. Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess heralds a
new era in WLAN security. June 2003.
URL: http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/wireless/library/wi-roamll/
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generated which prevents WEP's key reusal vulnerability while all is done
automatically and transparently to the user.
Because WEP also lacks a robust authentication mechanism for users,
WPA will require an authentication server when used in a large corporate
environment. This setting is called enterprise mode. WPA's authentication
scheme involves implementing EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) with the
IEEE 802.1 x standard - both authentication scheme and standard will be further
explained later on. This type of authentication will need a central authentication
server that authenticates each user individually before they can be granted
permission to join a network or access point. In this instance, RADIUS is an
example of such an authentication server and will be explained in greater detail
later on. When authenticating using a RADIUS authentication server, a network
is selected based upon an SSID by finding an access point. After authenticating
with the access point, keys are obtained and installed on the client. Association
then occurs with the above authentication scheme (EAP) and standard (802. 1x).
This type of authentication also prevents the occurrence of association with
rogue access points (access points established by unauthorized personnel),
since both ends must go through a 'mutual
authentication'before the client is
accepted into the network.
However, for small offices or home offices (SOHO) which may not have a
central authentication server or an EAP foundation; WPA can run in a special
home mode. In this home mode, manually-entered keys or passwords called
Pre-Shared Key (PSK) are used instead. At each access point and each
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computer which is part of the wireless network, a password or master key is
entered at each end and WPA will take care of the rest. Unfortunately, no
standardized form to changing the PSK is yet available. Two steps are involved
when running in home mode, the first involves filtering out nodes without the
proper password to prevent eavesdroppers and the second involves the use of
the TKIP encryption process. However if the PSK is ever revealed, security will
be greatly compromised.
Advantages of upgrading to
WPA32
A software/firmware upgrade to existing access points and NICs
Inexpensive in terms of time and cost to implement
Cross-vendor compatible
Suitable for enterprise, small sites, home networks
Runs in enterprise mode or pre-shared key (PSK) mode
Fixes all known WEP privacy vulnerabilities
Designed and scrutinized by well-known cryptographers
Pragmatic sacrifice of best possible security to minimize performance
degradation on existing hardware
Will work in home, small business, and enterprise environments
Migration from WEP to
WPA33
Enterprise environments
o Select EAP types and 802.1 X supplicants to be supported on
stations, APs, and authentication servers
o Select and deploy RADIUS-based authentications servers
o Upgrade APs with WPA software and firmware
o Upgrade client stations with WPA software and firmware
32 Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess Web Cast. Wi-Fi Alliance. June 2003.
URL: http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/pdf/Wi-Fi_ProtectedAccessWebcast_2003.pdf
33 Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess. Wi-Fi Alliance. October 2002.
URL: http://www.weca.net/OpenSection/pdf/Wi-Fi_Protected_Access_Overview.pdf
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SOHO
o Upgrade the APs with WPA software and firmware
o Upgrade client stations with WPA software and firmware
o Configure pre-shared key (PSK) or master password on the AP
o Configure the PSK on client stations
Issues over implementing WPA34
Moving to WPA is "all or
nothing"
All access points and client radios will need new firmware and drivers
Some older NICs and access points may not be upgradeable
Once enterprise access points are upgraded, home units will need to be, if
they were using WEP
In all, while WPA is an improvement to WEP, WPA is considered only a
temporary solution to increase the security of wireless networks already using
WEP. During the initial writing of this thesis, WPA was reported "to be available
in final form until sometime in September
2003"35 in an article written back in
October 2002. As of current writing, a more actual and up to date day could not
be found. In the meantime, the more permanent and probably next generation in
wireless security will involve 802.1 1 i. However, "WPA is a subset of the 802.1 1 i
draft standard and is expected to maintain forward compatibility with the
standard"36
so WPA can be considered a stepping stone into 802.1 1 i.
34 Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess Web Cast. Wi-Fi Alliance. June 2003.
http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/pdf/Wi-Fi_ProtectedAccessWebcast_2003.pdf
35 Kane, Margaret. Wi-Fi getting new security standard. October 2003.
URL: http://news.com.com/2100-1033-964046.html?tag=bplst
36 Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess Web Cast. Wi-Fi Alliance. June 2003.
http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/pdf/Wi-Fi_ProtectedAccessWebcast_2003.pdf
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The following diagram is a predicted timeline regarding the course of WPA
written by the Burton Group captured from the presentation mentioned above.
y$$n The Promise of WPA
Wi-Fi Alliance Security Roadmap
WPA Certification
2002
j Optional
WPA v2 Certification
2003 I
Optional$*
2004
November
WPA Inlerop Test
Development
Starts
Mandatory WPA
Certification 8/31
April 29
WPA Certification Begins
CM I
Expected 802.1H
Ratification
WPA v2 includes full
802.11i support
including CCMP
encryption
02
Expected 802.11i
Product Availability
-
030
Possible to Start 802.1 1/
Interoperability Testing
802. 1 1i
During the time of this writing, 802.1 1 i is considered to be a work-in-
progress and obviously has not been released yet. The estimated release and
its Wi-Fi certification date were expected to be in the forth quarter of 2003 in an
article written in April 2003 but that has yet to happen. A more recent and up to
date release date could not be found. As mentioned in the above paragraph,
WPA is a subset of 802.1 1 i so there will be many similarities between the two.
Like WPA, its greatest improvements over WEP include "improved security for
data in transit and better control of who can use a
network."37 802.1 1i's
authentication scheme will use the 802. 1x standard, which will be explained later,
along with Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), which will also be explained
37 Goodwins, Rupert. 802.1li- designed to integrate. April 2003.
URL: http://techupdate.zdnet.co.uk/story/0t481-s2133239,00.html
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later. However unlike WPA, the encryption algorithm used will be Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES). While most of the security issues needing
improvements over WEP have been addressed, the only concerns found revolve
over fast roaming over access points. The concepts of roaming will be explained
later. As of the time of this writing, 802.1 1 i looks very promising in terms of what
it can do but its usage and future remains unclear. Only time will tell if this
standard will accomplish what it was setout to do, offer a more robust way of
securing a wireless network overWEP.
Authentication Protocols and Encryption Algorithms
802. 1x
In the above mentioned paragraph regarding WPA and 802.1 1 i, 802. 1x
was mentioned before as a standard for authentication. This IEEE standard
involves the use of network access authentication which was ratified recently in
June of 2001. In a computer network environment regardless if it is wired or
wireless, this standard allows for authorization of use after authentication through
key management. The keys can be used for per packet authentication, integrity,
and confidentiality. Because the basis of 802.1x's approach lies in
implementation at the upper layers, the addition of new authentication and key
management can occur without changing hardware components such as network
cards or access points. This will allow hardware costs to go down while letting
administrators choose a security plan that best suites their needs.
802.1x's strong points include the ability to work over existing network
infrastructures such as RADIUS, LDAP, and others. While PPPoE (Point to Point
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over Ethernet) also provides authentication, it has one great disadvantage over
802. 1x. 802. 1x has the advantage of having the lack of overhead that is
associated with PPPoE.
802. 1x authentication with Wi-Fi occurs when a user or client wants to be
authenticated with an authentication server. The authentication process between
the user/client and authentication server occurs without adding overhead to the
access point during actual authentication. Because most access points are small
and most lack in memory and processing power, Wi-Fi is a perfect environment
for 802. 1x because the actual authentication process involves so little out of the
access point so it will not be a bottleneck. The authentication process can be
summarized as the following:38
1 . The access point sends an 'EAP-Request/ldentity' to the user/client when
it has associated with the access point.
2. The user/client sends an 'EAP-Response/ldentity' packet to the
authenticator, which is then passed on to the authentication (RADIUS)
server.
3. The authentication server sends back a challenge to the access point,
such as with a token password system. The access point unpacks this
from IP and repackages it into 802.1x's protocol and sends it to the
user/client. Different authentication methods will vary this message and
the total number of messages.
4. The user/client responds to the challenge via the authenticator and passes
the response onto the authentication server.
5. If the user/client provides proper identity, the authentication server
responds with a success message, which is then passes onto the
user/client. The access point now allows access to the LAN - possibly
38 Snyder, Joel. What is 802.1x? Network World Global Test Alliance. May 2002.
URL: http://www.nwfusion.com/research/2002/0506whatisit.html
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restricted based on attributes that came back from the authentication
server.
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)
In the above mentioned paragraph regarding WPA, EAP was mentioned
before as a mechanism for authentication. While it was originally designed to
supplement PPP (Point to Point Protocol used in dialup connections), its
authentication mechanism can be used and applied to WPA. During the time of
writing, not much information regarding the direct use of EAP in conjunction with
WPA could be found so the basic process will be explained with EAP used in
conjunction with PPP. However, the basic principles used of EAP used in PPP
can be directly applied to WPA. During the communication establishment
process, both ends of a PPP link send packets using the Link Control Protocol
(LCP). After the link has been established, an optional authentication phase is
available. If more authentication is preferred, a specific authentication protocol
must be specified during the link establishment phase. This is where EAP comes
into play, "EAP is a general protocol for PPP authentication that supports multiple
authentication mechanisms. EAP does not select a specific authentication
mechanism at the link control phase, but rather postpones this until the
authentication
phase."39 By using this scheme, the authenticating end is able to
collect the most information from the end requesting authentication before
39 Minoli, Daniel. Security Considerations for Hotspot Services [Online]. McGraw-Hill, 2003.
URL: http://80-librarv.books24x7.com.ezproxv.rit.edu/book/id 5131/viewer.asp?chunkid=492012788
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actually staring the EAP process. The authentication process consists of the
following:40
1 . "After the link establishment phase is complete, the authenticator sends
one or more requests to authenticate the peer. The request has a type
field to indicate what is being requested... Typically, the authenticator will
send an initial identity request followed by one or more requests for
authentication information."
2. "The peer sends a response packet in reply to each request. As with the
request packet, the response packet contains a type field that corresponds
to the type field of the request."
3. "The authenticator ends the authentication phase with a success or failure
packet."
With the availability of EAP, the following kinds of authentication can be
used:41
"Smart cards such as Fortezza, SecurlD, and other token technologies"
"MD5-CHAP, which provides 1 28-bit encryption during authentication"
"Kerberos authentication, the standard authentication method forWindows
2000, Windows XP, and Windows .NET Server"
"Transport Layer Security (TLS), which is implemented in Web browsers,
smart cards, biometric authentication
devices"
RADIUS (Remote Access Dial In User Service) authenticaion server
This type of authentication server is mostly used for remote access
servers when there is a need for network access authentication. The network
40 Minoli, Daniel. Security Considerations for Hotspot Services [Online]. McGraw-Hill, 2003.
URL: http://80-librarv.books24x7.com.ezproxv.rit.edu/book/id 5131/viewer.asp?chunkid=492012788
41 Encyclopedia ofNetworking, Second Edition [Online]. Microsoft Press, 2002.
URL: http://80-librarv.books24x7.com.ezproxy.rit.edu/book/id 5850/viewer.asp?chunkid=554137828
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can include either an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or a network that needs a
form of central authentication. From Nortel's website, "RADIUS Server is an
industry-leading AAA server designed to meet the authentication, authorization,
accounting
(AAA)."42 The benefit of RADIUS includes the ability to support a
variety of authentication schemes and protocols including the ones mentioned
above. Authorization is kept track with a database of a user's ID, password, and
other credentials which is used in conjunction with the appropriate authentication
scheme. Accounting functions include the ability to allow "access servers to
confirm delivery of usage and session information to a central RADIUS
accounting
server."43
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
In the above mentioned paragraph regarding 802.1 1 i, AES was mentioned
before as an algorithm used for encryption. AES is a cryptographic algorithm that
has been effective since May 2002. It was created when the National Institute of
Science and Technology made a request for a cryptographic algorithm. Out of
the many that were created, AES was the final candidate. AES's algorithm is a
based upon a block cipher.
"This means that the number of bytes that it encrypts is fixed. AES
can currently encrypt blocks of 16 bytes at a time; no other block
sizes are presently a part of the AES standard. If the bytes being
encrypted are larger than the specified block then AES is executed
concurrently. This is also means that AES has to encrypt a
42 Nortel Networks
URL: http://www.nortelnetworks.com/products/04/radius/
43 Backman, Dan. RADIUS Servers: Funk And Shiva Go Head-To-Head.
URL: http://www.networkcomputing.com/912/912rl.html
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minimum of 16 bytes. If the plain text is smaller than 16 bytes then
it must be padded"44
The block cipher is called RIJNDAEL which was named after its two Dutch
inventors, Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. Since AES is a block cipher, the
following are all characteristics:45
"AES works by repeating the same defined steps multiple times"
"AES is a secrete key encryption algorithm"
"AES operates on a fixed number of bytes"
Roaming Issues
Multiple Access Points with the same SSID
There are many instances where a location may have more than one
access point available. If all local access points share the same SSID, a wireless
client will associate with the access point that can provide the strongest signal. If
that signal were to become severed, the wireless client will then reassociate with
another access point in the same network. If roaming is expected, enabling an
access point with 'shared
use' is highly recommended. Fortunatley when
roaming, the client will still be able to retain its current IP address in a concept
called MoblelP. Although it is an interesting topic, it is not much related to this
thesis and will not be further discussed. However with increased security
measures taken such as authentication; more steps will be added to the roaming
process.
44
Berent, Adam. Advanced Encyption Standard by Example. ABI Software Development.
URL: http://www.net-securitv.org/dl/articles/AESbyExample.pdf
45
Berent, Adam. Advanced Encyption Standard by Example. ABI Software Development.
URL: http://www.net-security.org/dl/articles/AESbvExample.pdf
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Multiple Access Points with an authentication server
When an authentication server is used to provide authorization to a
recongized client when roaming between different access points, roaming can
be accomplished through methods like MoblelP (mentioned above) with a
RADIUS server. During the transaction of finding another access point, the client
will not have to re-reassociate with the access point. Instead, only a
reauthentication with the RADIUS server is necessary. The same steps that
were performed in the assoication prior to the roam is repeated except "the
encryption/integrity keys are removed from the encryption/integrity engine when
roaming away from the AP that the keys were obtained from. The station then
deletes the keys when it disassociates/deauthenticates from the previous
SSID."46 This is all done while the client's session is still currently running. While
the use of MobilelP and 802. 1x is still under study, perhaps they will be used
more in the common place in the future.
Author's recommendations
Based upon the researched gathered in order to write this thesis, the
following paragraphs includes ways to enforce a more secure wireless network.
Although with all the many ways of securing networks whether they are wireless
or not, the following list of security protocols are the most recommended during
the writing of this thesis. They include implementing a firewall, implement WEP,
make appropriate adjustments on the access point, implement Fake AP, detect
rogue access points, and finally implement a VPN.
46 Loeb, Larry. Roaming charges: Out with the WEP. in with the WPA. Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess heralds a
new era in WLAN security. June 2003.
URL: http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/wireless/library/wi-roamll/
49
Implement a firewall
The first recommended line of defense especially when connected to
public media like the Internet, is to have a firewall established. With a firewall,
the internal network can be configured to become stealth or invisible to the
outside world where the internal network is hidden from the rest of the world.
This type of defensive serves useful against hackers who iniate IP scans and
probes. A firewall also monitors traffic going into the internal network and also
traffic leaving the internal network, if the traffic is suspecious then appropriate
action such as denying its travel can occur. While implementing a firewall is a
good first line of defense, it is only one step in the prevention of malicious
hackers. The battle against hackers and intrusions has just begun.
Implement WEP
Although WEP is flawed in the sense that it can be cracked, it still provides
another line of defense. If someone where to hack into a wireless network,
cracking WEP would be another step necessary before doing so. As a
comparision, implementing WEP would be like locking the door to one's house.
Yes, an intruder can still break in but it is one more step that needs to be done
before breaking in. Use the highest level of WEP encryption available, during the
time of writing 256bit is the highest. Change the WEP keys periodically as well.
If the keys are changed, be careful how the new keys are distributed to wireless
nodes. This extra step may be the determining decesion whether an intruder
attempts to break into a specific wireless network or moves onto another wireless
network down the street.
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Securely configure the access point
Disable the access point's SSID broadcast. After all, how can an intruder
find your wireless network without hearing its SSID unless a sign is posted
outside saying that there is a wireless network inside! Periodically change the
SSID at least once a month or sooner depending on the level of mission-critical
data. If it is never changed, the chances of an intruder discovering it greatly
increases whether it is from sniffing enough packets or even through the means
of social engineering. Also, enabling Mac filtering is highly recommended. With
Mac filtering, only recognized hardware components existing on the network will
be allowed to associate with the wired or wireless network. Mac addresses
which are not recognized are simply ignored by the access point. Although a
Mac address can be spoofed or remarked like a wolf in sheep's clothing, such a
task involves intercepting a valid Mac address and reprogramming an
unauthorized computer with the valid Mac address. Such an act will be one more
step needed before an intruder can unlawfully connect with an access point.
Implement Fake AP
Fake AP is a Linux based code program developed by Black Alchemy
that "generates thousands of counterfeit 802.11b access points. Hide in plain
sight amongst Fake AP's cacophony of beacon frames. As part of a honeypot or
as an instrument of your site security plan, Fake AP confuses Wardrivers,
NetStumblers, Script Kiddies, and other
undesirables."47With this software
implemented, someone who is on a wardriving rampage would detect an
overwhelming amount of access points. With so many access points available,
47 Black Alchemy.
URL: http://www.blackalchemy.to/project/fakeap/
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the potential hacker will more then likely find an access point which is a decoy
and later move to another area which has less access points to chose from. It
can be downloaded from http://www.blackalchemv.to/proiect/fakeap/.
Detect rogue access points
Even though a wireless network administrator may take many means to
provide a relatively safe wireless network, it can only stay resonably safe only if
its access point have been setup and deployed by its authorized Information
Technology staff. In some instances, personnel may inadvertantely setup their
own access point without knowledge of proper security measures. Rouge
access points (access points that have been deployed by unauthorized
personnel) is a serious breech of security. AiroPeek is a commercial wireless
protocol analyzer that provides "information specifying the channel number and
radio frequency at which packets are transmitted, as well as the speed and signal
strength of a transmission... a full-featured packet analyzer for IEEE 802.11
wireless
LANs"
and can be used to detect rouge access points48 Detection of
them involves AiroPeek decrypting and decoding an encrypted packet with the
authorized access point's WEP key. By letting AiroPeek perform this function,
encrypted packets unable to be decrypted or decoded must be coming from
rouge access points. A demonstration of how AiroPeek can detect rouge access
points can be viewed from http://www.wildpackets.com/products/airopeek/videos.
Once rouge access points have been detected and found, it is up to wireless
network administrators to discontinue its services and to prevent future
48 Wild Packets, AiroPeek.
URL: http://www.wildpackets.com/products/airopeek/features
52
reoccurrences in order to prevent potential malicious attack into those insecure
access points.
Implement a VPN
VPN stands for Virtual Private Network. It is generally used to connect
two private computers or networks together through a public connection such as
the Internet, however this method of security can will be applied to wireless
networks. As directly quoted from Wi-Fi.org, "So while using WEP will protect
you from most external intruders, you may want to implement additional
techniques to protect your transmissions as they travel on public networks and
the Internet. There are several technologies available, but currently VPN works
best."49 In order to keep the transmission of private data private while
transmitting over public media, encrpytion and tunneling is used to accomplish
this task. It should be implemented after a mobile user connects to an access
point and before a mobile user is allowed access to critical data.
Tunneling is esentially taking a data packet and encapsulating it in another
packet before it is sent through the public media, ie. the Internet. Once the
encapsulated data has been received, the packet is uncapsulated to retrieve the
orginal data packet. Encapsulating protocols include PPTP (Point to Point
Tunneling Protocol) which uses GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation), and L2TP
(Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol) which uses IPSec (IP Security Protocol). Both
encapsulating protocols can transmit over transmission protocols such as IPX,
NetBeui, and IP.
49 Wi-Fi ProtectedAccess. Wi-Fi Alliance.
URL: http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/secure.asp?TID=2
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A general description describing the difference between PPTP and L2TP
was found on an Internet mailing list. It is described as follows:
"The PPTP protocol uses a Cisco GRE tunnel (tunneling over ip, no
encryption) on top of the GRE tunnel as a transport and then PPP
running The PPP configuration and the user authentication is done
in the clean then the PPP tunnel itself gets encrypted. The user
authentication uses Microsoft's protocols...L2TP replaces the GRE
tunnel with an IPSec tunnel and then PPP is done over the IPSec
tunnel. This means that the PPP config and the user Auth is done
inside an encrypted tunnel...since the user auth is done inside an
encrypted tunnel you don't have the same issue with packet sniffing
and cracking the password. Since PPP config is done in a
encrypted tunnel you don't have the same issue with session
hijacking."50
Given the above simple explanation, implementing a VPN server which uses
IPSec as the tunneling protocol is the recommended choice for the most amount
of security.
Implement a RADIUS authentication server
Although RADIUS was mentioned before when used in conjuction with
new authentication schemes, there is no reason why it can not be used in direct
conjunction with Wi-Fi and WEP. In fact, RADIUS'S capabilities of supporting
authentication and authorization by itself makes it a very viable and available
alternative. Many free linux-based servers are available for download off the
Internet.
Setup a 'honey
pot'
Setting up a 'honey
pot' is a very good way of setting up an environment
capable of learning what kind of bystanders, from black hats to script kiddies, will
one be dealing with. A honey pot is "a system (or a network) that is specifically
50 How secure is VPN on Win2000 Server? Mailing List.
URL: https://lists.shmoo.com/pipermail/vpn/2000-May/001283.html
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designed to let the attacker in, preferably without the attacker knowing he's being
watched."51 Also, not installing security patch updates is recommended as it will
allow an administrator to see which specific exploit is performed. This also allow
an administrator to see at what level of skill does the hacker posses. To view
further information about honey pots, visit www.honeynet.org.
Thus with the combination of implementing a firewall, implementing WEP
and making specific access point configurations, running Fake AP, detecting and
stopping rouge access points, setting up a VPN server, implementing a RADIUS
authentication server, and finally setting up a honey pot; the chances of an
intruder's ability to gain unlawful entry would be dramatically reduced. If all the
following measures were implemented and an attack has been carried out and
sucessfully acomplished, only a team of professional and truly deticated hackers
would carry out such an act. But the goal of this thesis is to present a guide for
the average or imtermediate network administrator on ways to safeguard a
smaller to medium sized wireless network from prying and malicious casual
intruders in hopes that they will move onto an easier target.
Conclusion
As more and more wireless networks are constantly being deployed,
network administrators must deploy the necessary security measures which
supplement Wi-Fi. Unfortunately, the current security measure in the form of
WEP alone is not enough. Because WEP has been well exploited, new wireless
security measures need to be established and made available. Currently Wi-Fi
51 Constantine, Carl. Tools of the Trade: Parti. O'Reilily Network. June 2001.
URL: http://linux.oreillynet.eom/pub/a/linux/2001/06/22/linux_security.html
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will not become obsolite, in fact it will only continue to grow in popularity for the
rest of the century due to its convience and the benefits of increased productivity
through mobility. This thesis has documented why WEP can not be used alone
with Wi-Fi. Also, covered are recommend steps to creating a more secure
wireless network given the available tools during the time of this writing. It has
also covered alternatives for replacing and/or supplementing WEP which may or
maynot be implemented as an offical standard during the time of writing. No
matter how outdated the presented material becomes, it is up to the network
administrator to keep atop of the lastest security trends, vulnerabilities, and
exploits. With great freedom of mobility comes a greater sense of vulnerability
and responsibility. As once said by Benjamin Franklin, "Those who would
sacrifice freedom for security deserve
neither"52 holds extremely true when
dealing with computer networks especially those with Wi-Fi.
52 Goodwins, Rupert. 802. Hi -designed to integrate. April 2003.
URL: http://techupdate.zdnet.co.uk/story/0t481-s2133239,00.html
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